A remote user is name@host here, in users.username, in paths (/@alice@music.example) and in mentions, through one handle rule in shared/validation.ts that paths, MENTION_RE and Markdown all build on; Markdown undoes GFM's email autolink of a handle. Their name, email and avatar come from their home at each sign-in and by its signed events (federation_outbox, delivered by the federation job with backoff): a rename at home leaves the old handle an alias here, and a password change or a withdrawn grant ends their sessions here. Their password, email, avatar and name can't change here (assertLocalUser), nor can they sign in elsewhere from here. An admin keeps the trusted and blocked instances on /manage (federation:manage): a trusted instance's users sign in from a button on the login page, a blocked one's can't and are signed out at once, and any other's join with an invite from the register page. The /authorize page asks the user once per instance, and /settings lists the instances their account signs in to, each disconnectable; /login?next= brings a signed-out visitor back to /authorize. Emails stay unique among local accounts only, and migration 0024 adds the tables, makes that index partial and reserves authorize and federation as category slugs. remote/gerbeur-instance.ts is the only way to other instances: https and public addresses only, no redirects, no certificate fallback, unless GERBEUR_FEDERATION_ALLOW_PRIVATE lets two instances on one machine talk. 298 backend tests and 702 frontend tests pass, and deno check, deno fmt, deno lint, tsc, eslint, doc:lint and i18n:compile --strict are clean; checked end to end with two built instances on one machine: sign-in through the other's login and consent pages, consent skipped once granted and asked again after disconnecting, a rename and a password change at home reaching the other, and blocking; screenshots of the login, consent, profile, settings and manage pages at 1280 and 390px. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
298 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
298 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Signs and verifies the server's four kinds of token (session, media,
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* password reset and unsubscribe), all HS256 with the one key. Only a token's signature and
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* expiry are checked here: `lib/auth.ts` checks a session or media token
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* against its user.
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*
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* It also signs and verifies the tokens instances exchange for federated
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* sign-in (identity tokens and events), EdDSA with the instance's Ed25519 key,
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* whose public half other instances fetch: `instance-key-service.ts` keeps
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* the key, and the federation services pass it in.
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*
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* Importing this module throws when `GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET` is unset.
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*
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* @module
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*/
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import {
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createLocalJWKSet,
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exportJWK,
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generateKeyPair,
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importJWK,
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type JSONWebKeySet,
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type JWK,
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type JWTPayload,
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jwtVerify,
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SignJWT,
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} from "@panva/jose";
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import {
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type AuthPayload,
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isAuthPayload,
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isPasswordResetPayload,
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type PasswordResetPayload,
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} from "../model/auth.ts";
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import { JWT_SECRET } from "../config.ts";
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import { type DigestCadence, isDigestCadence } from "../../shared/settings.ts";
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import type { AuthTokens, Role } from "../../shared/user.ts";
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if (!JWT_SECRET) {
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throw new Error(
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"GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET environment variable is required. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32",
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);
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}
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const JWT_KEY = new TextEncoder().encode(JWT_SECRET);
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/**
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* Signs a password reset token for `userId`, valid for an hour. The token
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* isn't single-use by itself: `requestPasswordReset` stores it, and
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* `resetPassword` marks it used.
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*/
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export async function createPasswordResetToken(
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userId: string,
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): Promise<string> {
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return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "password-reset", userId })
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
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// Two requests in the same second would otherwise sign the same token,
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// which is the primary key of `password_reset_tokens`.
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.setJti(crypto.randomUUID())
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.setExpirationTime("1h")
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.sign(JWT_KEY);
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}
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/**
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* Returns the payload of a password reset token, or null when it is invalid,
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* expired or another kind of token. Whether it was used is the caller's check.
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*/
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export async function verifyPasswordResetToken(
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token: string,
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): Promise<PasswordResetPayload | null> {
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try {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
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if (!isPasswordResetPayload(payload)) return null;
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return payload as PasswordResetPayload;
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Signs a session token carrying `payload`, valid for 7 days.
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* {@link issueTokens} issues it on sign-up, sign-in and password change, and
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* the client sends it as a bearer token.
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*/
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export async function createJWT(
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payload: Omit<AuthPayload, "exp">,
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): Promise<string> {
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return await new SignJWT(payload)
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
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// A password change revokes tokens by comparing `iat` with
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// `users.tokens_valid_after`.
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.setIssuedAt()
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.setExpirationTime("7d")
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.sign(JWT_KEY);
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}
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/**
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* Returns a new session token and media token for `user`, as sign-up
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* (`POST /api/users`), sign-in (`POST /api/sessions`) and a password change
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* (`PUT /api/me/password`) answer them.
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*/
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export async function issueTokens(
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user: { id: string; username: string; role: Role },
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): Promise<AuthTokens> {
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return {
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token: await createJWT({
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userId: user.id,
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username: user.username,
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role: user.role,
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}),
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mediaToken: await createMediaToken(user.id),
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};
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}
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/**
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* Signs a media token for `userId`, valid for 7 days. Media elements can't send
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* an `Authorization` header, so the URLs of private files, thumbnails and
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* playlist covers carry this token as `?token=`, where it lands in logs and
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* browser history. It only reads media, so a leaked URL doesn't expose the
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* account.
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*/
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export async function createMediaToken(userId: string): Promise<string> {
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return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "media", userId })
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
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.setIssuedAt()
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.setExpirationTime("7d")
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.sign(JWT_KEY);
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}
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/**
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* Returns the user id and issue time of a media token, or null when it is
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* invalid, expired or another kind of token.
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*/
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export async function verifyMediaToken(
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token: string,
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): Promise<{ userId: string; iat?: number } | null> {
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try {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
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if (payload.purpose !== "media" || typeof payload.userId !== "string") {
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return null;
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}
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return { userId: payload.userId, iat: payload.iat };
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Returns the payload of a session token whose signature and expiry are valid,
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* or null. Call `authenticate` (`lib/auth.ts`) instead, which also checks the
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* token against its user.
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*/
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export async function verifyJWT(token: string): Promise<AuthPayload | null> {
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try {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
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if (!isAuthPayload(payload)) {
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return null;
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}
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return payload;
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} catch (err) {
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console.error("JWT verification failed:", err);
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Signs the token of a digest's unsubscribe link, which turns off `cadence`
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* for `userId` without signing in. It never expires, so the link in an old
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* email still works; turning the digest back on doesn't revoke it, which is
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* harmless since all it can do is turn it off again.
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*/
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export async function createUnsubscribeToken(
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userId: string,
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cadence: DigestCadence,
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): Promise<string> {
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return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "unsubscribe", userId, cadence })
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
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.sign(JWT_KEY);
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}
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/**
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* Returns the user and cadence of an unsubscribe token, or null when it is
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* invalid or another kind of token.
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*/
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export async function verifyUnsubscribeToken(
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token: string,
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): Promise<{ userId: string; cadence: DigestCadence } | null> {
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try {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
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if (
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payload.purpose !== "unsubscribe" || typeof payload.userId !== "string" ||
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!isDigestCadence(payload.cadence)
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) {
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return null;
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}
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return { userId: payload.userId, cadence: payload.cadence };
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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/**
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* The algorithm of the tokens instances exchange: Ed25519 signatures, short
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* and fast, with no parameters to get wrong.
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*/
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const INSTANCE_ALG = "EdDSA";
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/**
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* An instance's key, ready to sign, from {@link importInstanceKey}. Its
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* `kid` names the public half in the instance's JWKS.
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*/
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export interface InstanceSigningKey {
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kid: string;
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privateKey: CryptoKey;
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}
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/**
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* Returns a new Ed25519 key pair as JWKs, with a random `kid`, for
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* `instance-key-service.ts` to store when the instance has none. The public
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* JWK carries the `kid`, `alg` and `use` a JWKS entry needs.
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*/
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export async function generateInstanceKey(): Promise<
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{ kid: string; privateJwk: JWK; publicJwk: JWK }
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> {
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const { privateKey, publicKey } = await generateKeyPair(INSTANCE_ALG, {
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crv: "Ed25519",
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extractable: true,
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});
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const kid = crypto.randomUUID();
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return {
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kid,
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privateJwk: await exportJWK(privateKey),
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publicJwk: {
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...await exportJWK(publicKey),
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kid,
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alg: INSTANCE_ALG,
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use: "sig",
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},
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};
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}
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/** Returns the stored private JWK `privateJwk` as a key to sign with. */
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export async function importInstanceKey(
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kid: string,
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privateJwk: JWK,
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): Promise<InstanceSigningKey> {
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const privateKey = await importJWK(privateJwk, INSTANCE_ALG);
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if (!(privateKey instanceof CryptoKey)) {
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throw new Error("The instance key is not an asymmetric key");
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}
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return { kid, privateKey };
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}
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/**
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* Signs `payload` with the instance's key, from `issuer` (this instance) to
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* `audience` (the instance it is for), valid for `expiresIn`, with a random
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* `jti`. The identity tokens of `POST /api/oauth/tokens` and the events of
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* the outbox are signed with it.
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*/
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export async function signInstanceToken(
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payload: JWTPayload,
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key: InstanceSigningKey,
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claims: { issuer: string; audience: string; subject: string },
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expiresIn: string,
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): Promise<string> {
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return await new SignJWT(payload)
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: INSTANCE_ALG, kid: key.kid })
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.setIssuer(claims.issuer)
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.setAudience(claims.audience)
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.setSubject(claims.subject)
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.setIssuedAt()
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.setJti(crypto.randomUUID())
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.setExpirationTime(expiresIn)
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.sign(key.privateKey);
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}
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/**
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* Returns the payload of `token` once its signature checks against `jwks`,
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* the keys of `issuer`, and it is addressed to `audience` and unexpired.
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*
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* @throws {Error} jose's error when it doesn't verify; its `code` is
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* `ERR_JWKS_NO_MATCHING_KEY` when no key of `jwks` has its `kid`, which
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* tells the caller to refetch the keys, the issuer having rotated them.
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*/
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export async function verifyInstanceToken(
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token: string,
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jwks: JSONWebKeySet,
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claims: { issuer: string; audience: string },
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): Promise<JWTPayload> {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, createLocalJWKSet(jwks), {
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issuer: claims.issuer,
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audience: claims.audience,
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algorithms: [INSTANCE_ALG],
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});
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return payload;
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}
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