Files
gerbeur/api/lib/jwt.ts
khannurien 14e3ab125b v3: fix the privacy and security findings of the comment pass — private dumps' broadcasts, mentions and attachments reached people who can't see them, and a few smaller holes. A dump's every write now goes through ws-service's broadcastDumpChange(before, after), which decides the audience: a private dump's creation, edits and deletion reach its owner's sockets alone (its deletion id went to everyone before), going private is dump_deleted for everyone else and dump_updated for the owner (whose other tabs dropped it), going public dump_created for everyone else. Mentions in a private dump, a comment on one, or a private playlist's description notify no one until it goes public (mentions are deduplicated per context, so going public notifies them once), and a moderator's edit of a comment, chat message or playlist mentions in the author's name. A link preview of a private playlist is refused, as one of a private dump already was: the preview is stored in the linking dump, which others may see. Attachments record the type of the resource that links them (migration 0018 backfills it); one linked by a private dump or playlist, or a comment on a private dump, is served only with its owner's media token, which Markdown now adds to attachment URLs, and one whose resource is gone answers 404 and is purged at startup. The Bandcamp provider claimed bandcamp.com.evil.example (the pattern wasn't anchored) and now reuses bandcamp-tralbum's anchored one; the YouTube provider took any site's ?list= for a YouTube playlist and missed m., music., youtube-nocookie and /live/ links, and now shares canonical-url's rules. Sign-in does the same scrypt work for an unknown username as for a wrong password, so timing no longer tells which exist. Usernames and emails are unique regardless of case (migration 0017, which refuses to run over existing clashes and names them): "Bob" and "bob" could both sign up and a mention picked one, emails had no constraint, and a reset request in another case silently sent nothing. The Open Graph tags escape the site name and build their URLs on PUBLIC_URL and FRONTEND_URL instead of the request's origin, which a proxy may rewrite.
Error statuses follow one rule: APIException takes a status and derives the code from it (BAD_REQUEST 400, UNAUTHORIZED 401, FORBIDDEN 403, NOT_FOUND 404, CONFLICT 409, RATE_LIMITED 429, SERVER_ERROR 500, BAD_GATEWAY 502), so a code can't contradict its status. That fixed real bugs: a wrong current password on change-password answered 401, on which authFetch signs the user out; editing or deleting someone else's comment or chat message answered 401 rather than 403; one invalid dump edit answered 422. A taken username is 409, like a taken email.

Along the way: the database is created from schema.sql by connection.ts when the file doesn't exist, so every task works on a fresh checkout (dev and serve never ran db/init.ts, which is gone); the startup purge compared ISO dates with SQLite's datetime() as text and kept anything from the current UTC day, and now compares ISO cutoffs; the seeded admin's hash comes from lib/password.ts (split out of jwt.ts, which needs the JWT secret) rather than a copy of its format; avatar, thumbnail and playlist-cover uploads go through replaceUploadedFile, which writes beside the old file and renames over it before the record announces it (a failed avatar write lost the old avatar; a thumbnail was announced before it existed); upload.ts derives its size message from MAX_IMAGE_SIZE_BYTES and stops re-exporting the upload folders; ALLOWED_IMAGE_MIMES, which duplicated detectImageMime, is gone; the SPA fallback no longer calls next() after answering; a reply must answer a comment on the same dump (a foreign or unknown parent was a 500 or a cross-dump thread). 211 backend and 628 frontend tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 15:19:07 +00:00

131 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Signs and verifies the server's three kinds of token (session, media and
* password reset), all HS256 with the one key. Only a token's signature and
* expiry are checked here: `lib/auth.ts` checks a session or media token
* against its user.
*
* Importing this module throws when `GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET` is unset.
*
* @module
*/
import { jwtVerify, SignJWT } from "@panva/jose";
import {
type AuthPayload,
isAuthPayload,
isPasswordResetPayload,
type PasswordResetPayload,
} from "../model/auth.ts";
import { JWT_SECRET } from "../config.ts";
if (!JWT_SECRET) {
throw new Error(
"GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET environment variable is required. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32",
);
}
const JWT_KEY = new TextEncoder().encode(JWT_SECRET);
/**
* Signs a password reset token for `userId`, valid for an hour. The token
* isn't single-use by itself: `requestPasswordReset` stores it, and
* `resetPassword` marks it used.
*/
export async function createPasswordResetToken(
userId: string,
): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "password-reset", userId })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
// Two requests in the same second would otherwise sign the same token,
// which is the primary key of `password_reset_tokens`.
.setJti(crypto.randomUUID())
.setExpirationTime("1h")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns the payload of a password reset token, or null when it is invalid,
* expired or another kind of token. Whether it was used is the caller's check.
*/
export async function verifyPasswordResetToken(
token: string,
): Promise<PasswordResetPayload | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (!isPasswordResetPayload(payload)) return null;
return payload as PasswordResetPayload;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Signs a session token carrying `payload`, valid for 7 days. The users routes
* issue it on sign-up, sign-in and password change, and the client sends it as
* a bearer token.
*/
export async function createJWT(
payload: Omit<AuthPayload, "exp">,
): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT(payload)
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
// A password change revokes tokens by comparing `iat` with
// `users.tokens_valid_after`.
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("7d")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Signs a media token for `userId`, valid for 7 days. Media elements can't send
* an `Authorization` header, so the URLs of private files, thumbnails and
* playlist covers carry this token as `?token=`, where it lands in logs and
* browser history. It only reads media, so a leaked URL doesn't expose the
* account.
*/
export async function createMediaToken(userId: string): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "media", userId })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("7d")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns the user id and issue time of a media token, or null when it is
* invalid, expired or another kind of token.
*/
export async function verifyMediaToken(
token: string,
): Promise<{ userId: string; iat?: number } | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (payload.purpose !== "media" || typeof payload.userId !== "string") {
return null;
}
return { userId: payload.userId, iat: payload.iat };
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Returns the payload of a session token whose signature and expiry are valid,
* or null. Call `authenticate` (`lib/auth.ts`) instead, which also checks the
* token against its user.
*/
export async function verifyJWT(token: string): Promise<AuthPayload | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (!isAuthPayload(payload)) {
return null;
}
return payload;
} catch (err) {
console.error("JWT verification failed:", err);
return null;
}
}