Files
gerbeur/api/lib/jwt.ts
khannurien 4468438ba7 v4: every page and API URL follows one of two rules, written down in API.md — pages are a hierarchy where @name is a user and any other root word a category or an app page, tabs and views are plain segments and a default view is the bare path; API resources are /api/<plural>/<key>, a user's key being an id or @name, the caller's things under /api/me, media a sub-resource, lookups by another key a query filter. ~ is gone: the feed is /, /hot, /new, /journal, /follow and /music/hot, a profile /@bob with its overview and the tabs dumps, upvoted, playlists (her own only), follow (users, and /follow/playlists), invitees and manage (role and name, for user:manage), which replace the separate UserDumps, UserUpvoted and UserPlaylists pages; /settings holds the account (now with the username) and /manage the category manager, both linked from the user menu and one's profile. Dumps and playlists live under their owner, /@bob/dumps/<slug> and /@bob/playlists/<slug>, named by slug alone: migration 0021 re-slugs them to the bare slugify(title), unique per owner and kind (the oldest keeps it, clashes get -2), renames the categories whose slug v4 reserves (hot, follow, settings…), and rewrites this site's v3 links in dump notes, comments, chat, and playlist and profile descriptions. A slug changes only when edited, through the edit forms' new link field, which proposes slugify(title) as the title changes; a username changes from /settings or, for user:manage, from /@name/manage. Every slug or name left behind stays an alias of its item or user for good (dump_slug_aliases, playlist_slug_aliases, user_aliases), so old links redirect without chaining and nobody else can take one; slugs change 3 times a day per item, names once in 30 days, moderators exempt. An alias, or a name in another case, answers the item with its current path: the pages put it in their URL (useCanonicalPath, without fetching again), and the OG middleware answers a 301. shared/paths.ts builds and parses every page path, for the client's links, the emails' (digest-service lost its own builders and its id fallbacks, and links /follow and /settings) and the server's matchers (OG tags, self previews, backlinks, self-url); shared/slug.ts holds slugify and the format categories share. Dumps and playlists carry ownerUsername and a required slug, and notifications join their users' current names and their items' paths each time they are sent or read, so renames reach them and a deleted item's has no link. The API was renamed per the plan's table: POST /api/users and /api/sessions, /api/password-resets, /api/me (with settings, password, avatar, media-token, playlists?contains=, follow, feed?from=, notifications), /api/users/:key/{dumps,upvoted,playlists,follow/users,follow/playlists,invitees,avatar} and by path /api/users/:key/{dumps,playlists}/:slug, /api/dumps?url= and ?category=, /api/dumps/:id/{file,thumbnail,metadata}, /api/playlists/:id/cover, /api/remote/{preview,image,bandcamp,youtube} (one router), and /api/unsubscribe, the v3 POST /api/users/unsubscribe staying for the digests already sent. A stored default feed tab "followed" reads as "follow" once. dumps.slug and playlists.slug stay nullable, since SQLite can't add NOT NULL without rebuilding tables others reference; every writer sets them and unique (user_id, slug) indexes hold them. 254 backend tests (new: migration 0021 on a v3 fixture, slug aliases, swaps and rate limits, username renames, aliases and limits, reads by path and their privacy, the OG 301s, both unsubscribe paths, v4-shaped digest links with no ids, notification joins, shared paths and slugs) and 668 frontend tests (new: the profile's tabs and follow views, Settings, Manage, the link field, canonical URLs on the dump, playlist and profile pages, bare default feed paths) pass, and tsc, eslint, deno check, deno lint, deno fmt and doc:lint are clean; the migration was also run on a copy of the development database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 16:08:59 +00:00

187 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Signs and verifies the server's four kinds of token (session, media,
* password reset and unsubscribe), all HS256 with the one key. Only a token's signature and
* expiry are checked here: `lib/auth.ts` checks a session or media token
* against its user.
*
* Importing this module throws when `GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET` is unset.
*
* @module
*/
import { jwtVerify, SignJWT } from "@panva/jose";
import {
type AuthPayload,
isAuthPayload,
isPasswordResetPayload,
type PasswordResetPayload,
} from "../model/auth.ts";
import { JWT_SECRET } from "../config.ts";
import { type DigestCadence, isDigestCadence } from "../../shared/settings.ts";
import type { AuthTokens, Role } from "../../shared/user.ts";
if (!JWT_SECRET) {
throw new Error(
"GERBEUR_JWT_SECRET environment variable is required. Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32",
);
}
const JWT_KEY = new TextEncoder().encode(JWT_SECRET);
/**
* Signs a password reset token for `userId`, valid for an hour. The token
* isn't single-use by itself: `requestPasswordReset` stores it, and
* `resetPassword` marks it used.
*/
export async function createPasswordResetToken(
userId: string,
): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "password-reset", userId })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
// Two requests in the same second would otherwise sign the same token,
// which is the primary key of `password_reset_tokens`.
.setJti(crypto.randomUUID())
.setExpirationTime("1h")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns the payload of a password reset token, or null when it is invalid,
* expired or another kind of token. Whether it was used is the caller's check.
*/
export async function verifyPasswordResetToken(
token: string,
): Promise<PasswordResetPayload | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (!isPasswordResetPayload(payload)) return null;
return payload as PasswordResetPayload;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Signs a session token carrying `payload`, valid for 7 days.
* {@link issueTokens} issues it on sign-up, sign-in and password change, and
* the client sends it as a bearer token.
*/
export async function createJWT(
payload: Omit<AuthPayload, "exp">,
): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT(payload)
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
// A password change revokes tokens by comparing `iat` with
// `users.tokens_valid_after`.
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("7d")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns a new session token and media token for `user`, as sign-up
* (`POST /api/users`), sign-in (`POST /api/sessions`) and a password change
* (`PUT /api/me/password`) answer them.
*/
export async function issueTokens(
user: { id: string; username: string; role: Role },
): Promise<AuthTokens> {
return {
token: await createJWT({
userId: user.id,
username: user.username,
role: user.role,
}),
mediaToken: await createMediaToken(user.id),
};
}
/**
* Signs a media token for `userId`, valid for 7 days. Media elements can't send
* an `Authorization` header, so the URLs of private files, thumbnails and
* playlist covers carry this token as `?token=`, where it lands in logs and
* browser history. It only reads media, so a leaked URL doesn't expose the
* account.
*/
export async function createMediaToken(userId: string): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "media", userId })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
.setIssuedAt()
.setExpirationTime("7d")
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns the user id and issue time of a media token, or null when it is
* invalid, expired or another kind of token.
*/
export async function verifyMediaToken(
token: string,
): Promise<{ userId: string; iat?: number } | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (payload.purpose !== "media" || typeof payload.userId !== "string") {
return null;
}
return { userId: payload.userId, iat: payload.iat };
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Returns the payload of a session token whose signature and expiry are valid,
* or null. Call `authenticate` (`lib/auth.ts`) instead, which also checks the
* token against its user.
*/
export async function verifyJWT(token: string): Promise<AuthPayload | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (!isAuthPayload(payload)) {
return null;
}
return payload;
} catch (err) {
console.error("JWT verification failed:", err);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Signs the token of a digest's unsubscribe link, which turns off `cadence`
* for `userId` without signing in. It never expires, so the link in an old
* email still works; turning the digest back on doesn't revoke it, which is
* harmless since all it can do is turn it off again.
*/
export async function createUnsubscribeToken(
userId: string,
cadence: DigestCadence,
): Promise<string> {
return await new SignJWT({ purpose: "unsubscribe", userId, cadence })
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
.sign(JWT_KEY);
}
/**
* Returns the user and cadence of an unsubscribe token, or null when it is
* invalid or another kind of token.
*/
export async function verifyUnsubscribeToken(
token: string,
): Promise<{ userId: string; cadence: DigestCadence } | null> {
try {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_KEY);
if (
payload.purpose !== "unsubscribe" || typeof payload.userId !== "string" ||
!isDigestCadence(payload.cadence)
) {
return null;
}
return { userId: payload.userId, cadence: payload.cadence };
} catch {
return null;
}
}