Files
gerbeur/api/services/invite-service.ts
khannurien 2ad8ae73d5 v3: the API stops trusting what it's handed — a review of api/ turned up a server anyone could crash, uploads that ran script on the app's origin, and a server that would fetch its own network on request, and this closes them along with the smaller holes around them. A WebSocket message that wasn't an object (a bare null will do) threw inside the listener, which Deno treats as uncaught and exits on; messages are now shape-checked and the handler can't throw out. Uploaded files kept the MIME type the uploader's browser claimed, so an .html or .svg dump opened from /api/files ran with the session token in reach; only images, audio, video, PDF and plain text are served inline now, the rest download, and every file carries nosniff and a sandboxing CSP (PDFs aside, which Chrome won't render sandboxed). The image proxy passed image/svg+xml straight through the same way and now takes raster formats only. Outbound fetches for previews, the proxy and Bandcamp checked the hostname against a partial list — no 169.254.169.254, no 0.0.0.0, an IPv6 check that never matched a bracketed hostname, nothing for names that resolve inward, and redirects followed blindly; every hop now resolves and is refused if any address is private or reserved, redirects are walked by hand, the curl fallback is pinned to the checked IP, and /api/preview needs a login. PATCH /users/me accepted a new password without the current one and now takes only the description and email; a wrong password at login answered 500 because the handler caught its own 401, and now says 401. Changing or resetting a password now ends every older session through users.tokens_valid_after (migration 0015) and an iat on every token, with change-password handing back fresh tokens the modal keeps, and all token checks go through one authenticate() that also refuses deleted users. Invites and reset links are claimed atomically before the async hash rather than marked after, so one invite no longer opens several accounts, and an email address belongs to one account. File and thumbnail URLs carry a media-only token rather than the session token, so a URL in a log exposes files and not the account; older sessions fetch one on load. Private things stop leaking into broadcasts: private playlist updates go to their owner, votes and likes on someone else's private dump 404 and their counts go to the owner alone, and a private dump can't be slipped into a playlist. Smaller: selfProvider only claims this site's own host, so github.com/users/bob stops rendering our bob; the chat read marker can't be parked in the future on an empty chat; dump mutations use the resolved id so a slug works; multipart dumps get the title and comment limits; logins and reset requests are rate-limited through a shared token bucket; the password compare is constant-time; ffmpeg reads only local files in known video containers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-24 20:07:33 +00:00

86 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { APIErrorCode, APIException } from "../model/interfaces.ts";
import { db, isInviteRow } from "../model/db.ts";
import { UNUSED_INVITES_RETENTION_DAYS } from "../config.ts";
/** Short, opaque, URL-safe invite token (128 bits of entropy → 22 chars). */
function generateInviteToken(): string {
return randomBytes(16).toString("base64url");
}
export function createInvite(inviterId: string): string {
const token = generateInviteToken();
db.prepare(
`INSERT INTO invites (token, inviter_id, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?);`,
).run(token, inviterId, new Date().toISOString());
return token;
}
/**
* Looks the token up, checks it has not been used and has not expired (same
* 7-day window as the startup cleanup). Returns the inviterId on success;
* throws APIException otherwise.
*
* Tokens are opaque random strings stored as the row's primary key. Invites
* created before this scheme (full JWTs) are still stored verbatim in the
* token column, so they continue to validate by direct lookup.
*/
export function validateInvite(token: string): string {
const row = db.prepare(
`SELECT token, inviter_id, used_at, created_at FROM invites WHERE token = ?;`,
).get(token);
if (!row || !isInviteRow(row)) {
throw new APIException(
APIErrorCode.NOT_FOUND,
404,
"Invalid or expired invite",
);
}
if (row.used_at !== null) {
throw new APIException(
APIErrorCode.VALIDATION_ERROR,
409,
"Invite already used",
);
}
const expiresAt = new Date(row.created_at).getTime() +
UNUSED_INVITES_RETENTION_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
if (Date.now() > expiresAt) {
throw new APIException(
APIErrorCode.NOT_FOUND,
404,
"Invalid or expired invite",
);
}
return row.inviter_id;
}
/**
* Validates the token and marks it used in one step, returning the inviterId.
* Claim before the (async) account creation, not after: checking first and
* marking later lets parallel registrations all pass the check on one invite.
*/
export function claimInvite(token: string): string {
const inviterId = validateInvite(token);
const result = db.prepare(
`UPDATE invites SET used_at = ? WHERE token = ? AND used_at IS NULL;`,
).run(new Date().toISOString(), token);
if (result.changes === 0) {
throw new APIException(
APIErrorCode.VALIDATION_ERROR,
409,
"Invite already used",
);
}
return inviterId;
}
/** Hands a claimed invite back when the account it was claimed for failed. */
export function releaseInvite(token: string): void {
db.prepare(`UPDATE invites SET used_at = NULL WHERE token = ?;`).run(token);
}